Whither the Arab Spring?
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/15/whither_the_arab_s... Posted By Dov Zakheim
Thursday, December 15, 2011
With the first anniversary of Mohammed Bouazizi's self-immolation rapidly approaching (on December 17), and the second round of Egyptian voting currently underway, the tumult in the Arab world that began with the death of the unemployed young Tunisian one year ago has yet to subside. It remains far too early to tell what the so-called Arab Spring will yield, but the trends on several countries certainly provide cause for considerable concern.
In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party has emerged as that country's most powerful political force. While it claims it will not form a coalition with the more extreme Salafist al-Nour party, its leaders are not the moderates some in the West wish -- or hope -- that they are. True, they have not yet repudiated the treaty with Israel. But to do so would cost Egypt the massive assistance, both military and economic, that it receives from the United States, a development that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which benefits from that aid and retains control of Egypt's guns, simply will not tolerate.
On the other hand, the status of Egypt's Coptic minority, some ten percent of its population, hangs in the balance. Religious tensions are at fever pitch, and the Copts are voting virtually as a bloc for parties that strongly oppose the Islamists. How the Copts will fare in the medium term will be as much of an indication of where Egypt is headed as will be the treatment of women, which Secretary Clinton continues to emphasize to her Egyptian interlocutors.
One thing is clear, the young secularists who were at the forefront of the revolution that brought down Hosni Mubarak have suffered the fate of Alexander Kerensky. They are now essentially bystanders, which in truth, is all that could have been expected of them. Egyptians themselves assert that most of their countrymen are not radical Islamists by nature, but will acknowledge that, like the vast majority of Arabs, they are religiously traditional and socially conservative. Most Egyptians cannot be expected to buy into secular Western norms the way the more secular-minded, Western educated, English and French speakers would have their friends in Washington, London, Paris and Brussels believe. It is not at all a foregone conclusion, therefore, that ordinary Egyptians, who don't have Facebook accounts, will resonate to Secretary Clinton's message. As for the SCAF, it appears that it will let the politicians play their games, but, as with pre-Erdogan Turkey, will intervene if they feel the country is spinning out of control. Of course, if an Islamist with the talents of an Erdogan emerges on the Egyptian scene, the SCAF may find itself as outmaneuvered as, much to their dismay, have been the Turkish generals.
No two Arab countries are alike. Perhaps in contrast to Egypt, the prospects for Tunisia retaining its moderate pro-Western stance remain good, despite the Islamist Ennahda Party's leading that country's coalition government. One test of where Tunisia is heading will be the treatment of its small (1800 souls) Jewish community, which has lived in that country for thousands of years and has been carefully protected by the military since Tunisia's independence from France. While Tunis has no formal relations with Israel, the government has permitted Tunisian Jews to visit their relatives there. Travel to Israel is the canary in the Tunisian coal mine; should it be banned, it can be expected that the Islamists will bare their teeth in other ways. That they are in a coalition with liberals is no guarantee of future moderation; Czechoslovakia's Communists were in a coalition with liberals from 1945-48 before they formally brought that country behind Stalin's iron curtain.
Libya has been another poster child of the Arab Spring. Again, in terms of achieving liberal values there is less than meets the eye. Militias abound, Islamists are active, tribal and regional rivalries remain as sharp as ever. The Libyan story is far from over, despite NATO's having declared "mission accomplished."
And then there is Syria. The country is plunging into civil war, to the point where even the stolid Arab League has had enough of Bashar al-Assad (who declares that he hasn't ordered the killing of anyone; it's the Army that seems to be acting on its own). With Christians generally siding with the ruling Alawis out of fear of a Muslim Brotherhood takeover; with Kurds wary of any outcome that reduces their own prospects; with Turkey, with its "neighborhood policy" bankrupt, fearful of more Kurdish terror should Syria suffer from all-out sectarian warfare; and with Iran continuing to back Assad, "spring" is not exactly the description that seems most apt for the situation in Syria.
In addition, one should not forget that President Obama's so-called democratic ally, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, not only has refused to back the Arab League's suspension and sanctions of, Syria, but has continued to expand economic ties with Damascus. Moreover, it is asserted in some Middle Eastern quarters that Iraq is actively supporting Assad by permitting military supplies to enter Syria from its territory. Given that Maliki has retained the defense and interior ministry portfolios; seems bent on repressing any Sunnis dare oppose him; and while stoutly declaring Iraq's independence from Iran, has done nothing to diminish Iranian influence in his country, one may legitimately wonder how Iraq fits into the construct of the Arab Spring.
There have been demonstrations elsewhere in the Arab world-from Morocco to Yemen-but actual changes of government are another matter. At one extreme, the popular King Mohammed VI of Morocco has changed the constitution to give more power to political parties-as in Tunisia, moderate Islamists have formed a government-but has retained control over national security and foreign policy, and, equally important, remains at the apex of the state's religious hierarchy. At the other extreme, Ali Abdulla Saleh continues to buy time in Yemen. An extended stay in Saudi Arabia did not bring down his government.
The traditional monarchies in the Gulf remain stable. Bahrain is the notable exception. The government's Sh'ia opponents appear to be encouraged by Hezbollah, acting as Iran's agent, since Tehran recognizes that Arab Sh'ia will resonate more with their Lebanese cousins than with Persian big brothers. Washington should be wary about pressuring Manama; it is not merely a matter of Bahrain's importance to America's strategic posture in the region. It is also an issue of American credibility. It is not only the Saudis who believe that America threw Hosni Mubarak under the bus after having done the same to Pervez Musharraf, and, for that matter, the Shah of Iran.
At the end of the day, there clearly is no Middle East-wide Arab Spring. Indeed, there may not be an Arab Spring at all. Not a single Arab state is being led by the kind of secular liberals that Washington favors, and the cloud of Islamism hangs over the entire region. Whether the Arab Spring will lead directly into winter remains unclear, but Washington and its allies, including its Arab allies, have every good reason to worry that it might.
================================THE HINDU (Daily English newspaper in Chennai, India) October 29, 2011
The Other Half: Women and the Arab Spring
In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party has emerged as that country's most powerful political force. While it claims it will not form a coalition with the more extreme Salafist al-Nour party, its leaders are not the moderates some in the West wish -- or hope -- that they are. True, they have not yet repudiated the treaty with Israel. But to do so would cost Egypt the massive assistance, both military and economic, that it receives from the United States, a development that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which benefits from that aid and retains control of Egypt's guns, simply will not tolerate.
On the other hand, the status of Egypt's Coptic minority, some ten percent of its population, hangs in the balance. Religious tensions are at fever pitch, and the Copts are voting virtually as a bloc for parties that strongly oppose the Islamists. How the Copts will fare in the medium term will be as much of an indication of where Egypt is headed as will be the treatment of women, which Secretary Clinton continues to emphasize to her Egyptian interlocutors.
One thing is clear, the young secularists who were at the forefront of the revolution that brought down Hosni Mubarak have suffered the fate of Alexander Kerensky. They are now essentially bystanders, which in truth, is all that could have been expected of them. Egyptians themselves assert that most of their countrymen are not radical Islamists by nature, but will acknowledge that, like the vast majority of Arabs, they are religiously traditional and socially conservative. Most Egyptians cannot be expected to buy into secular Western norms the way the more secular-minded, Western educated, English and French speakers would have their friends in Washington, London, Paris and Brussels believe. It is not at all a foregone conclusion, therefore, that ordinary Egyptians, who don't have Facebook accounts, will resonate to Secretary Clinton's message. As for the SCAF, it appears that it will let the politicians play their games, but, as with pre-Erdogan Turkey, will intervene if they feel the country is spinning out of control. Of course, if an Islamist with the talents of an Erdogan emerges on the Egyptian scene, the SCAF may find itself as outmaneuvered as, much to their dismay, have been the Turkish generals.
No two Arab countries are alike. Perhaps in contrast to Egypt, the prospects for Tunisia retaining its moderate pro-Western stance remain good, despite the Islamist Ennahda Party's leading that country's coalition government. One test of where Tunisia is heading will be the treatment of its small (1800 souls) Jewish community, which has lived in that country for thousands of years and has been carefully protected by the military since Tunisia's independence from France. While Tunis has no formal relations with Israel, the government has permitted Tunisian Jews to visit their relatives there. Travel to Israel is the canary in the Tunisian coal mine; should it be banned, it can be expected that the Islamists will bare their teeth in other ways. That they are in a coalition with liberals is no guarantee of future moderation; Czechoslovakia's Communists were in a coalition with liberals from 1945-48 before they formally brought that country behind Stalin's iron curtain.
Libya has been another poster child of the Arab Spring. Again, in terms of achieving liberal values there is less than meets the eye. Militias abound, Islamists are active, tribal and regional rivalries remain as sharp as ever. The Libyan story is far from over, despite NATO's having declared "mission accomplished."
And then there is Syria. The country is plunging into civil war, to the point where even the stolid Arab League has had enough of Bashar al-Assad (who declares that he hasn't ordered the killing of anyone; it's the Army that seems to be acting on its own). With Christians generally siding with the ruling Alawis out of fear of a Muslim Brotherhood takeover; with Kurds wary of any outcome that reduces their own prospects; with Turkey, with its "neighborhood policy" bankrupt, fearful of more Kurdish terror should Syria suffer from all-out sectarian warfare; and with Iran continuing to back Assad, "spring" is not exactly the description that seems most apt for the situation in Syria.
In addition, one should not forget that President Obama's so-called democratic ally, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, not only has refused to back the Arab League's suspension and sanctions of, Syria, but has continued to expand economic ties with Damascus. Moreover, it is asserted in some Middle Eastern quarters that Iraq is actively supporting Assad by permitting military supplies to enter Syria from its territory. Given that Maliki has retained the defense and interior ministry portfolios; seems bent on repressing any Sunnis dare oppose him; and while stoutly declaring Iraq's independence from Iran, has done nothing to diminish Iranian influence in his country, one may legitimately wonder how Iraq fits into the construct of the Arab Spring.
There have been demonstrations elsewhere in the Arab world-from Morocco to Yemen-but actual changes of government are another matter. At one extreme, the popular King Mohammed VI of Morocco has changed the constitution to give more power to political parties-as in Tunisia, moderate Islamists have formed a government-but has retained control over national security and foreign policy, and, equally important, remains at the apex of the state's religious hierarchy. At the other extreme, Ali Abdulla Saleh continues to buy time in Yemen. An extended stay in Saudi Arabia did not bring down his government.
The traditional monarchies in the Gulf remain stable. Bahrain is the notable exception. The government's Sh'ia opponents appear to be encouraged by Hezbollah, acting as Iran's agent, since Tehran recognizes that Arab Sh'ia will resonate more with their Lebanese cousins than with Persian big brothers. Washington should be wary about pressuring Manama; it is not merely a matter of Bahrain's importance to America's strategic posture in the region. It is also an issue of American credibility. It is not only the Saudis who believe that America threw Hosni Mubarak under the bus after having done the same to Pervez Musharraf, and, for that matter, the Shah of Iran.
At the end of the day, there clearly is no Middle East-wide Arab Spring. Indeed, there may not be an Arab Spring at all. Not a single Arab state is being led by the kind of secular liberals that Washington favors, and the cloud of Islamism hangs over the entire region. Whether the Arab Spring will lead directly into winter remains unclear, but Washington and its allies, including its Arab allies, have every good reason to worry that it might.
================================THE HINDU (Daily English newspaper in Chennai, India) October 29, 2011
The Other Half: Women and the Arab Spring
The cusp of change: Exercising the choice democracy brings. Photo: AP
As change sweeps through the Arab world and dictatorships are toppled, will women's rights be forgotten as it happened in Iran?
As the Arab Spring moves through the Arab Autumn towards winter, there is hope but also anxiety and apprehension about the future. The elections in Tunisia — with a record 90 per cent turnout — have triggered the hope that countries like Egypt and Yemen and now Libya, will also witness a peaceful transition to a democracy they have never known. But the grounds for apprehension are abundant.
As the world watches, a key question that is being raised is that of women's rights in the new political arrangements emerging in these countries. Arab women have spoken out, emphasising that a guarantee of their human rights is a prerequisite to a just society. But in the noise of the celebrations as dictators get toppled, these voices are sometimes being drowned out.
Arab voices
I was privileged to attend a fascinating discussion on the future of women in the Arab world at a recent conference in France. The Women's Forum for Society and the Economy 2011 drew together over a thousand women from around the world. But what turned out to be the most riveting session was the one where women from Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen and the renowned human rights activist and 2003 Nobel Peace Award winner Shirin Ebadi from Iran discussed how the future of Arab women would emerge following the Arab Spring. It threw up a relevant discourse on religion, secularism and law.
If women's rights are also human rights, then should societies fighting for the reassertion of human rights also first guarantee women their rights? Is it possible to allow religion to dictate law if the interpretation of that religion is left to men? Are rights that women have won, even in a dictatorship, still valid even after the overthrow of the dictator? Is it possible to have a ‘ secular' constitution and still respect religion and religious laws?
These were some of the questions that wove their way through the remarks made by the participants. Moushira Mahmoud Khattab, an impressive woman from Egypt who has been a diplomat and a Minister for Family and Population and is now a human rights activist, pointed out that even under Hosni Mubarak, women had won many rights. In fact, she was one of those central to bringing in laws to criminalise female genital mutilation (FGM) that is widespread in Egypt and other north African countries, raise the minimum age of marriage to 18, give women the right to initiate divorce, give women the right to custody of their children after divorce and allow children born outside wedlock to be registered. But now, after the January 25 uprising that led to the overthrow of Mubarak, she says there are voices that have been raised against these rights calling them “Suzanne's laws”. Suzanne was Mubarak's wife and all these changes were initiated in her name. But, asked Ms. Khattab, why should rights that women had won after a struggle be negated just because they had been initiated during a hated dictatorship? The role of women in the January 25 revolution was crucial, she said. Women challenged tradition when they went out and protested and even spent nights out in Tahrir square. Yet, today in Egypt, women's rights are being questioned.
Nadwa Al Dawsari is a young activist from Yemen. She has spent many days in Freedom Square in the Yemeni capital of Sana'a with this year's Nobel Peace Prize winner Tawakkul Karman, who lives in a tent in the square. Ms. Dawsari said there was an assumption that in tribal societies, like the one in Yemen, women had no rights. Yet, over 30 per cent of the protestors in Freedom Square were women. The young people of Yemen wanted a civil state, not an Islamic state, she said. She insisted that what was important now was to get the dictator to leave Yemen and for free elections to be held. Other issues could be tackled later, even if the election brought the Islamists to power.
Tunisian women, however, are not as confident as Ms. Dawsari about the Islamists coming to power. In fact, many have gone on record to say they fear for the future if the Islamist party, al Nahda, wins the elections. But what primarily concerned Amira Yahyaoui, a young blogger and militant human rights activist from Tunisia, was that women's rights in Tunisia ought not be compared to other Arab countries but to those where women are better off. “We want women and men to have real equality. Women need to be considered not as women but as human beings. What we have at present is not enough,” she said. Currently, although Tunisian women have more rights than their counterparts in some other Arab countries, they do not have equal rights of inheritance. They also cannot marry non-Muslims.
Ms. Yahyaoui was also not confident that women would have enough of a say in the process of constitution-making in Tunisia. Under the list system of proportional representation, women did not stand a chance of winning in substantial numbers as political parties tended to push male candidates to the top of their lists.
After listening to the young women from Tunisia and Yemen, Shirin Ebadi spoke. “Look at Iran”, she told them, “Do not repeat our mistakes.” When she saw images of the protestors in Syria, Yemen, Tunisia, she saw them demanding democracy. “Did anyone say we are against polygamy? That we want divorce rights? That we are human beings and need equal rights? You are making the same mistake Iranian women made. We thought we could demand women's rights after the revolution”, she said.
Ms. Ebadi said that the Iranian women who participated in the 1979 revolution that overthrew the Shah of Iran, knew what they did not want. They wanted an end to dictatorship. What they did not demand and insist upon were the rights that they did want. They did not go on the streets and demand an end to polygamy, or the right to divorce. It was taken for granted that these rights could be negotiated later.
Biased interpretation
“I am a practising Muslim woman”, said Ms. Ebadi, “but when a government is based on Sharia law, it can be interpreted in different ways.” She said that she did not believe that Sharia law was against human rights and democracy. But when it is left to men within a patriarchal system to interpret that law, inevitably the suppression of women's rights is justified. The best way to prevent that, she advised her Arab sisters, was to push for women's rights during the struggle. “Don't wait for the victory. Choose your allies. Dictate these conditions before the alliance”, she said.
She reminded the Tunisian about a recent incident where a TV channel was attacked for telecasting the film “Persepolis”, an animated feature film about women's rights in Iran. The director of the channel had to give a public apology. “These are not good signs”, she said. Ms. Ebadi said that although Iranian women had succeeded, even under a fundamentalist regime, in wresting many rights, these were not enough. “We
